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How do armies function? Why do large numbers of common soldiers follow the
orders of small numbers of ofﬁcers? These questions ought to interest more than
just historians of war, for the way in which military organizations work can tell us
something about processes of government in other settings. But the opposite is no
less true: we can learn much about armies by looking at the societies from which
they were recruited. To gain a better understanding of how eighteenth-century
armies functioned—the purpose of this article—we need to borrow three con-
cepts usually employed outside the military sphere: moral economy, contract, and
negotiated authority.
The idea of a moral economy, initially applied to the mentalité of eighteenth-
century English food rioters, is helpful as a means of illuminating the attitudes of
common soldiers to their service.1 The rank and ﬁle inhabited a world of custom,
precedent, and rights. Ofﬁcers who did not respect the soldiers’ sense of a set of
established entitlements were likely to ﬁnd it hard to secure obedience. Related to
the moral economy is contract, usually employed in political philosophy to
describe the nature of the reciprocal relationship between ruler and the ruled.
Eighteenth-century soldiers conceived of their service as a form of contract. The
contract in questionwas implied rather than written; but if ofﬁcers failed to live up
to the terms of the tacit bargain struck at enlistment—a variation on the time-
honored governing compact of obedience in return for protection—then soldiers
felt themselves no longer obliged to obey. Successful ofﬁcers recognized the need
to work within the boundaries of the soldiers’ moral economy and to acknowl-
edge the rank and ﬁle’s contractual thinking. Indeed, the key to ofﬁcers’ effective
exercise of power was to appreciate its limits and act accordingly. Here our ﬁnal
borrowed concept is useful. For historians of the eighteenth century, negotiated
1 The originator of the concept was E. P. Thompson: see his “The Moral Economy of
the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century,” Past & Present, no. 50 ð1971Þ: 76–136,
reprinted in his Customs in Common ðLondon, 1991Þ, chap. 4.
*I should like to thank the owners and custodians of the manuscript material used here
for permission to consult and quote from their papers and the anonymous readers of an
earlier version of the article for their helpful comments.
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authority came into scholarly currency mainly as a means of capturing the
political relationship between Britain and its American colonies in the decades
preceding the Revolution.2 But the give-and-take that it implies, the need for the
nominal superior to secure the agreement or at least acquiescence of the nominal
inferior, makes it applicable to the way in which eighteenth-century army ofﬁcers
were obliged to operate. Their authority was far from absolute; they could not
take it for granted that their men would always obey. Only by keeping within the
lines drawn by the military moral economy and their soldiers’ contractual atti-
tudes could ofﬁcers run their units effectively.
Many historians of eighteenth-century American armed forces assume that
thesemilitary dynamics were unique to their subjects of study. The provincial reg-
iments that were raised in the colonies in the Seven Years’ War and the Conti-
nental army that fought under Washington during the War of Independence ap-
pear in many accounts as quite different from European militaries of the time.
Americans, we are repeatedly told, would not unthinkingly obey. Soldiers in
provincial regiments and the Continental army had a strong sense of the contrac-
tual nature of their service. They had their own moral economy of rights and ob-
ligations. Their ofﬁcers, faced with soldiers whowere tenacious in defense of what
they saw as their entitlements, were forced to rely less on physical punishment and
its threat and more on appeals to reason, virtue, and pride. To illustrate the sup-
posed distinctiveness of this American military culture, historians of colonial and
revolutionary armed forces often draw a stark contrast with what they depict as a
highly disciplined British army, the product of a more hierarchical and authoritar-
ian social order, commanded by ofﬁcers whose control rested on brutal punish-
ments that reduced the common soldiers to unquestioning automata.3
2 See Jack P. Greene, Negotiated Authorities: Essay in Colonial Political and Consti-
tutional History ðCharlottesville, VA, 1994Þ, esp. chap. 1.
3 For references to the moral economy, contractual attitudes, and negotiated authority in
the American forces, see, e.g., Charles Patrick Neimeyer, America Goes to War: A Social
History of the Continental Army ðNewYork, 1996Þ, esp. 117, 132, 163, 164;Wayne Bodle,
The Valley Forge Winter: Civilians and Soldiers in War ðUniversity Park, PA, 2002Þ, 128–
29; Gregory T. Knouff, The Soldiers’ Revolution: Pennsylvanians in Arms and the Forging
of Early American Identity ðUniversity Park, PA, 2004Þ, 101. For more clearly exception-
alist claims, often making a direct comparison with the British army, see, e.g., Howard H.
Peckham, The War for Independence: A Military History ðChicago, 1958Þ, 204; Alan
Rogers, Empire and Liberty: American Resistance to British Authority, 1755–1763
ðBerkeley, 1974Þ, chap. 6; Douglas Edward Leach, Roots of Conflict: British Armed
Forces and Colonial Americans, 1677–1763 ðChapel Hill, NC, 1986Þ, chap. 6; Fred
Anderson, Crucible of War: The Seven Years’War and the Fate of Empire in British North
America, 1754–1766 ðNew York, 2000Þ, esp. 145–47, 219–21, 370–72; John Ferling,
Almost a Miracle: The American Victory in the War of Independence ðNew York, 2007Þ,
17–18; John A. Ruddiman, “‘A Record in the Hands of Thousands’: Power and Negoti-
ation in the Orderly Books of the Continental Army,” William & Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser.,
67 ð2010Þ: 747–74.
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Those who have studied the eighteenth-century British army more closely—a
rather small number of historians—realize that the contrast is greatly overdrawn.
British redcoats were far from robot-like. Several scholars have demonstrated
that members of the British rank and ﬁle had a well-developed sense of their
rights and staunchly resisted any attempts to infringe them.4 But these historians
are mainly interested in the life of the common soldiers as an aspect of labor
history; they say comparatively little about the various means—besides the lash
and the noose—by which the British army’s ofﬁcers sought to secure the obedi-
ence of their men.5 The current article builds upon earlier work on the British rank
and ﬁle and provides some new evidence of their attitudes drawn from the period
ca. 1740–83, or what we might loosely describe as the era of the American
Revolution. But its main contribution lies in shedding light on the ofﬁcers and the
ways in which their authority was negotiated.6 Here the evidence is almost
exclusively taken from the time of the War of Independence. The article also
seeks to move beyond a simple Anglo-American perspective by considering the
German auxiliary forces that served alongside British troops during that conﬂict.
By 1781, these German soldiers, known generically ðbut often inaccuratelyÞ as
Hessians—they came fromBrunswick,Waldeck,Ansbach-Bayreuth, andAnhalt-
Zerbst as well as Hessen-Kassel and Hessen-Hanau—constituted some 37 per-
cent of the British forces deployed in North America.7 They provide, in other
words, a large enough sample for us to see whether German troops also operated
on the basis of a military moral economy, contract, and negotiated authority.
Special features of the War of Independence, a skeptic might object, make the
British and German military units campaigning in North America unrepresenta-
tive of British and German armed forces more generally. In America, desertion
from the British and German forces was arguably facilitated by the presence of
4 See, esp. Peter Way, “Rebellion of the Regulars: Working Soldiers and the Mutiny of
1763–1764,” William & Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 57 ð2000Þ: 761–92, which explores a
moment of dramatic deﬁance; and Stephen Brumwell, Redcoats: The British Soldier and
War in the Americas, 1755–1763 ðCambridge, 2002Þ, 127–36, 313–14, which discusses
some of the rank and ﬁle’s ideas of “Rights and Resistance,” and offers a brief comparison
with the Continental army. See also GarethWilliamMorgan, “‘AClever Little Army’: The
British Garrison inBoston, 1768–1776” ðDPhil diss., University of Sussex, 2004Þ, chaps. 4
and 5; and Michael N. McConnell, Army and Empire: British Soldiers on the American
Frontier, 1758–1775 ðLincoln, NE, 2004Þ, esp. 23, 94–95.
5 For soldiers as workers, see esp., Peter Way, “Class and the Common Soldier in the
Seven Years War,” Labor History 44 ð2003Þ: 455–81.
6 An insightful recent essay by William P. Tatum III touches upon some of the issues
covered here, but mainly from the perspective of military law: see his “‘The Soldiers
Murmured much on Account of this Usage’: Military Justice and Negotiated Authority in
the Eighteenth-Century British Army,” in Britain’s Soldiers: Rethinking War and Society,
1715–1815, ed. Kevin Linch and Matthew McCormack ðLiverpool, 2014Þ, 95–113.
7 Rodney Atwood, The Hessians: Mercenaries from Hessen-Kassel in the American
Revolution ðCambridge, 1980Þ, 257 ðAppendix DÞ.
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civilians who spoke the same language. This linguistic encouragement did not
apply in the Low Countries, the traditional venue for eighteenth-century conﬂicts
between Britain and France, where German forces were also often deployed as
allies or auxiliaries of the British. The ease with which those who ﬂed their reg-
iments in North America could disappear may well have made their ofﬁcers try all
the harder to keep them, adopting a more negotiated style of authority than in
other settings less conducive to desertion. But desertion rates in North America
were in fact not appreciably different from desertion rates elsewhere. The pro-
portion of Hessian troops deserting in the colonies was comparable to that of
eighteenth-century German armies in general ðwhich mainly campaigned in
German-speaking landsÞ and the British army in Ireland ðwhere, according to one
report, there was “an almost universal disposition of the lower Class of People to
assist Deserters”Þ.8 There is no compelling reason, then, to believe that the British
and Hessian forces in America operated on a different basis from other British or
German armies.9
Gaps in the evidence make it difﬁcult to paint a full picture. Unsurprisingly,
perhaps, we have limited access to theminds of the common soldiers. Notmany of
them left any record of their thoughts, and those few accounts that we have focus
largely on matters other than the rank and ﬁle’s relationship with its ofﬁcers. We
are therefore reliant on fugitive scraps of ﬁrsthand testimony, supplemented by
secondhand glances into the world of the soldiery provided by ofﬁcial records—
particularly order books and court-martial proceedings—and private sources, prin-
cipally ofﬁcers’ diaries and letters. The lives of the noncommissioned ofﬁcers—
the corporals and especially the sergeants—are perhaps still more obscure, but
their role was probably crucial. A variety of contemporary sources tell us that
sergeants drilled the men and supervised their routine daily tasks.10 In all like-
lihood, middle-aged sergeants cautioned young and inexperienced ensigns and
8 See, e.g., M. S. Anderson,War and Society in Europe of the Old Regime, 1618–1789
ðLondon, 1988Þ, 165. For the Irish situation, see British Library, London ðhenceforth, BLÞ,
Buckinghamshire Papers, Add. MS 40,178, fol. 29, Nugent Temple to Thomas Town-
shend, November 8, 1782.
9 See, e.g., the situation in a British garrison in the Mediterranean: Ilya Berkovich,
“Discipline and Control in Eighteenth-Century Gibraltar,” in Linch and McCormack, Brit-
ain’s Soldiers, 114–30.
10 Military manuals recommended that sergeants and corporals should purchase food
for their squads using the soldiers’ subsistence money: see, e.g., Humphrey Bland, A
Treatise of Military Discipline: In which is Laid Down and Explained the Duty of the
Officer and Soldier, through the Several Branches of the Service, 9th ed. ðLondon, 1762Þ,
225; Thomas Simes, The Military Guide for Young Officers ðLondon, 1776Þ, 143. For the
importance of noncommissioned ofﬁcers more generally in the regimental order, see
Robert Hinde, The Discipline of the Light-Horse ðLondon, 1778Þ, 99. See also, for actual
practice, Huntington Library, San Marino, CA, Order-book of Archibald Campbell,
standing orders, June 30, 1778, HM 617, fol. 86.
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lieutenants against too punctilious an approach, or too quick a resort to severe
punishment. Sergeants may also have tried to defuse difﬁcult situations between
ofﬁcers and common soldiers by acting as intermediaries. Unfortunately, we
have little source material that sheds light on such processes, which means that
any account of authority and its negotiation must almost certainly be incom-
plete.11 Related to this problem is a wider one: ofﬁcial records are more likely
to identify and illuminate breakdowns in order and crises of command than the
successful functioning of a military unit. Yet, despite these evidential limita-
tions, with a little effort we can capture the essentials of the inner life of eighteenth-
century British and German armies.
I
James Wolfe, later immortalized by his early death at Quebec, wrote in October
1755 of British troops who had “no idea of a free born English Soldier’s
marching, working, or ﬁghting, but when he thinks proper.”12 Wolfe’s depiction
is a far cry from American historians’ image of redcoats cowed by brutal dis-
cipline, but it accords with what we can glean of their attitudes from other sources.
When they felt aggrieved at what they regarded as a breach of the military con-
tract, or behavior by their ofﬁcers that ran counter to their sense of fairness and to
the customs and traditions of the army, soldiers were likely to demonstrate their
dissent by leaving ðdesertionÞ, by taking from the local inhabitants what they felt
that they had been denied by their ofﬁcers ðplunderÞ, or even by expressing their
displeasure by refusing to obey orders ðmutinyÞ.
Each of these manifestations of dissent could, of course, have other causes than
the soldier’s perception that his ofﬁcer had failed to fulﬁl obligations inherent in
the bargain struck at the moment of recruitment. Desertion, for instance, might
arise from a soldier’s local attachments, or his intention to proﬁt by reenlisting in a
different corps, or his overwhelming sense of fear, or even his sickening of using
violence against others. Plunder might simply be a product of the soldier’s desire
to make money by selling stolen goods, often to buy alcohol. Mutiny could stem
from a lack of respect for inexperienced or unsuitable ofﬁcers. But in many cases,
11 For an instance of a British sergeant trying to persuade a corporal to apologize to a
lieutenant over a seemingly trivial incident, see the Seven Years’ War account of William
Todd in Andrew Cormack and Alan Jones, eds., Journal of Corporal Todd, 1745–1762,
Army Records Society, 18 ðStroud, 2001Þ, 209–10. Interestingly, this particular little cri-
sis appears to have been resolved not by the sergeant’s intervention but by the lieuten-
ant’s fellow ofﬁcers appealing to the battalion commander on the corporal’s behalf. The
Journal of Corporal Todd, 35, 37, 103, also provides examples of the attentiveness of ser-
geants to the well-being of the men.
12 West Sussex Record Ofﬁce, Chichester, Goodwood MSS, 223/3/5, Wolfe to the
Duke of Richmond, October 25, 1755.
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desertion, plundering, and mutiny seem to have been the consequences of the
rank and ﬁle’s belief that the military moral economy had been ignored or that the
implied military contract had not been honored.13 The parallels with American
thinking will be apparent if we look in turn at British soldiers’ ideas on the
legitimate exercise of authority, their length and location of service, their pay, and
their provisions.
Far from meekly accepting whatever their ofﬁcers did, British soldiers showed
their displeasure if they thought that a line had been crossed. They appear to have
acknowledged that their ofﬁcers could legitimately impose their own noncorpo-
real penalties for minor infractions; conﬁnement to quarters, extra duties, and
ordering offenders to wear their regimental jackets inside out, all recommended in
military manuals, seem not to have caused ill-feeling among the rank and ﬁle.14
Roger Lamb, a soldier in the Ninth Foot, was later to praise his battalion com-
mander, Major Mason Bolton, for employing such methods to bring erring mem-
bers of the rank and ﬁle back into line.15 But soldiers resented and resisted ar-
bitrary physical penalties imposed by ofﬁcers acting without the sanction of a
military court. The adjutant-general himself, perhaps recognizing the rank-and-
ﬁle perspective, expressed uneasiness about ofﬁcers’ beating the soldiers on their
own authority; the practice should be used as little as possible, he wrote in July
1775.16
At least a few members of the rank and ﬁle were so conﬁdent of their right to
better treatment that they wrote to superior ofﬁcers, or even government ministers
in London, to protest company or regimental ofﬁcers’ abuse of their authority. An
artilleryman penned his complaint to the commander-in-chief in 1779: too many
troops in America, he wrote, were beaten “like Dogs” without the authority of
courts-martial.17 The following year an anonymous soldier similarly told the
secretary at war that in the Twenty-ﬁfth Foot “no Man is Beat with a Cane or
13 For other causes of desertion, plunder, and mutiny, see, e.g., West Sussex Record
Ofﬁce, Chichester, Goodwood MSS, 223/3/16, Wolfe to Richmond, July 10, 1757; the
general court-martial of John Renshaw and Edward Slater of the 35th Foot, The National
Archives, Kew ðhenceforth, TNAÞ, War Ofﬁce Papers, WO 71/81, pp. 166–77; Thomas
Jones,History of New York, ed. E. E. DeLancey, 2 vols. ðNewYork, 1879Þ, 1:136–37; BL,
Liverpool Papers, Add. MS 38,212, fol. 216, Alexander Donald to Charles Jenkinson,
November 12, 1779. Peter Brock, “The Spiritual Pilgrimage of Thomas Watson: From
British Soldier toAmerican Friend,”QuakerHistory 53 ð1964Þ: 81–86, discusses a redcoat
who deserted because he became a conscientious objector.
14 See, e.g., Bennet Cuthbertson, Cuthbertson’s System, for the Complete Interior
Management and Oeconomy of a Battalion of Infantry ðBristol, 1776Þ, 125, 127; Hinde,
Discipline of the Light-Horse, 99.
15 Roger Lamb,Memoir of His Own Life ðDublin, 1811Þ, 68.
16 TNA, War Ofﬁce Papers, Adjutant-General’s Letter-book, WO 3/5, p. 49.
17 TNA, War Ofﬁce Papers, WO 71/89, p. 86, William Naylor to Clinton, April 17,
1779. The fact that Naylor was court-martialed is a reminder that ofﬁcers did not always
accept soldiers’ views on discipline.
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Stick at the pleasure of an Off r . . . but is legally tried by a Court Martiall And if
by them found guilty, is punished accord½ingly.” The writer continued that sol-
diers so treated “esteem their officers And in Action will Stand by them,” but
added “how different is the disposition of other Regiments!” His request was
simply that “in General orders you would please give it out that no off r what-
ever, he be, shall have it in his power to Beat the meanest of the rank and file
without being tried by Court Martial.”18
Soldiers complained of other forms of ill-treatment that they believed to be
unfair, and they took other forms of action in response. Regimental or even
company commanders who suspected a noncommissioned ofﬁcer of wrongdoing
might strip him of his rank. In December 1777, Colonel James Pattison of the
Royal Artillery declared in daily orders that an undisciplined bombardier ðthe
equivalent of a corporal in the infantryÞ was “unworthy of Remaining a Non
Commiss’d ofﬁcer” and should be “Reduced to a Gunner from this day from
Rank and pay.”19 Summary demotion of this kind could easily lead to as much
resentment as did arbitrary physical punishment, if the rank and ﬁle thought that
the ofﬁcer had acted hastily and unjustly. Corporal Thomas Sullivan of the Forty-
ninth Foot was reduced to a private by his battalion commander in Septem-
ber 1777. Sullivan believed that his lieutenant-colonel took this drastic action
simply because Sullivan could not explain the provenance of a piece of mutton
roasting on a campﬁre. The discontented Sullivan continued to serve in the ranks
until June of the following year, when he deserted. His decision to leave the
army owed much, no doubt, to his marrying a twenty-year-old Philadelphian
woman in December 1777. When the army evacuated the city, Sullivan and his
wife had to make an uncomfortable choice; she could follow him and his reg-
iment, or Sullivan could leave the army and stay in the city. But, by his own ac-
count, his decision to desert was also inﬂuenced by “the ill usage I received ðun-
deservedly,Þ when I was in the 49th Battalion,” which seems to be a reference
to the loss of his corporal’s rank on the lieutenant-colonel’s command.20
British soldiers enlisted in peacetime were usually expected to serve for as long
as the army needed them, but wartime recruits ðthe majority of men serving
during conﬂictsÞ were in a different situation.21 To encourage enlistment when
18 BL, Liverpool Papers, Add. MS 38,214, fol, 323, Anon. to Jenkinson, November 3,
1780.
19 Royal Artillery Institution,Woolwich, Royal Artillery Brigade Orders, 1777–78, MS
57, p. 57.
20 American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia, Thomas Sullivan Journal, pp. 253,
300, 406–7.
21 On paper, the British army was some 48,647 strong at the beginning of the War
of Independence, but in practice probably no more than 36,000 ofﬁcers and men were
actually serving. See Stephen Conway, The British Isles and the War of American Inde-
pendence ðOxford, 2000Þ, 13. Between September 1775 and September 1780 alone, more
than 73,000 men were added: see BL, Liverpool Papers, Add. MS 38,344, fol. 162.
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soldiers were desperately needed, British governments offered new recruits the
opportunity to serve for only three years or the duration of the war.22 Men who
were compelled to serve under the provisions of parliamentary recruitment acts,
or who volunteered to avoid being pressed, were enlisted on the same short-term
basis. Soldiers who had joined up on the understanding that they would serve
only for a set number of years naturally anticipated that they would be able to
leave the army at the expiry of their term, just as did American provincials in the
Seven Years’ War and Continental soldiers in the War of Independence. While
the evidence relating to British soldiers’ sensitivity about the length of their ser-
vice is not substantial, the few indications we have point unmistakably to the
kind of contractual attitude usually associated with their American counterparts.
In the spring of 1747, in the closing stages of the War of the Austrian Succes-
sion, soldiers pressed three years earlier demanded their discharge. From the
point of view of their commanding ofﬁcers, the timing could hardly have been
worse. The army, together with its allies, was about to embark on that year’s
Flanders campaign against the French. The aggrieved soldiers were bought off
only by the payment of a guinea per man and a promise of immediate release
when the troops went into winter quarters.23 The following September, regular
troops in the Louisbourg garrison also argued that, having served three years,
they were now entitled to their discharge; whether they were given an extra sum
of money to continue serving is not clear.24 In the spring of 1762, a similar dis-
content emerged in the army in America. An ofﬁcer’s notebook records the
“unbecoming behaviour of some Soldiers who have lately demanded their Dis-
charge aledging that their term of Service was expired.” On this occasion, a sig-
niﬁcant inducement was required to persuade the soldiers to continue with their
regiments: “Each man whose time of Service is expired ½will be reinlisted for
the War only and receive a gratuity of 3 Guineas, and his discharge upon Appli-
cation, at the expiration of it.”25
Soldiers might also hold their ofﬁcers to promises about the location of their
service. Those assured upon enlistment that they would be dispatched to one the-
ater of war could become mutinous if they were then ordered to go somewhere
quite different. As with length of service, the soldiers believed that a condition
agreed upon when they were recruited had not been met, and they were therefore
22 For short-term enlistments during the War of Independence, see notice signed by
Lord Barrington, the secretary at war, December 16, 1775, TNA, War Ofﬁce Papers, WO
26/29, p. 169.
23 Bodleian Library, Oxford, MS Eng. hist. g.4, p. 137, Order-book of Ensign Hamil-
ton, 3rd Foot Guards, April 17, 747.
24 National Archives of Scotland, Edinburgh, Cuninghame of Thornton Muniments,
GD 21/625, Garrison Orders at Louisbourg, September 4 and 10, 1747.
25 National Army Museum, Chelsea, MS 6707-11, Notebook of Lieut. Hamilton,
April 17, 1762.
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free to refuse to comply with their ofﬁcers’ commands. The most spectacular re-
bellions occurred in Highland regiments in which the rank and ﬁle had expected
to cross the Atlantic to North America, only to ﬁnd that their corps was ordered
instead to sail to India. Perhaps Highlanders were particularly prone to mutiny in
such circumstances. Their regiments contained large numbers of men who had
been recruited as a result of the inﬂuence of their landlords and might therefore
have been especially disaffected if their expectations of paternal care were dis-
appointed.26 But probably more signiﬁcant was the enthusiasm of many High-
landers to go to America. They seem to have viewed military service there as a
means of migration—assuming they survived the war, their regiment would be
disbanded in America and the discharged soldiers might even be offered land
grants in the colonies.27 India, by contrast, was much less attractive as a destina-
tion, despite its reputed riches. Mortality rates were particularly high among the
troops that went to Asia, and good-quality land—the real draw for Highland re-
cruits thinking of postwar possibilities—was not as readily available as it was in
North America.28 Even so, the virtues and disadvantages of the respective post-
ings were probably less important for the soldiers than their sense of a broken con-
tract. We can surmise that the mutineers justiﬁed their actions on the grounds that
the bargain struck at enlistment had not been honored. They were protesting at
being recruited on the basis of their serving in one place and then being allo-
cated, without their consent, to another. The mutiny in 1778 of Seaforth’s Seventy-
eighth Highlanders owed much to rumors that the regiment was about to embark
for service with the British East India Company. In 1783, two more regiments—
the Seventy-seventh and Eighty-third—similarly rebelled, again largely owing
to their being ordered to sail for India.29 Andrew Marshal, surgeon to the Eighty-
26 We need to be careful not to exaggerate the role of landowners in the enlistment
of soldiers for the Highland regiments; Highland landowners used their reputation as men
of inﬂuence to persuade the government in London to allow them to raise new regiments,
but they tried hard to spare their own estates from over-recruiting. See Andrew Mackillop,
“More Fruitful than the Soil”: Army, Empire, and the Scottish Highlands, 1715–1815 ðEast
Linton, 2000Þ; and Stephen Conway, “Entrepreneurs and the Recruitment of the British
Army in the War of American Independence, 1775–1783,” inWar, Entrepreneurs, and the
State in Europe and the Mediterranean, 1300–1800, ed. Jeff Fynn-Paul ðLeiden, 2014Þ,
111–30.
27 For Highland soldiers and the pull of land in America, see Matthew Dziennik, “The
Fatal Land: War, Empire, and the Highland Soldier in British America, 1756–1783” ðPhD
diss., University of Edinburgh, 2010Þ.
28 See, e.g., Centre of South Asian Studies, Cambridge, Cromartie Papers ðphoto-
copiesÞ, Eyre Coote to Lord Macleod, August 31, 1780, for the unhealthy state of the 73rd
Regiment and the desire of many of its ofﬁcers to return to Europe as quickly as possible.
29 Sylvia R. Frey, The British Soldier in America: A Social History of Military Life in
the Revolutionary Period ðAustin, TX, 1981Þ, 74. For Highland mutinies as a particular
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third Foot, left a vivid account of the mutiny, with the men “convening in small
circles, talking to one another.” Senior ofﬁcers at Portsmouth, where the regiment
was due to embark, tried on several occasions to quell the unrest by making
concessions, including offering to replace the unpopular lieutenant-colonel.30
British soldiers were also likely to mutiny if their pay was not forthcoming or
was subject to new deductions. The most celebrated incident, affecting British
troops in North America, occurred at the end of the Seven Years’ War in 1763.31
Sir JefferyAmherst, the British commander-in-chief, orderedmoney to be docked
from the pay of his soldiers to cover part of the costs of their provisions. Amherst
was responding to a new emphasis on economy encouraged by the government in
London, which was trying to come to grips with a national debt that had grown
enormously as a result of the war. But if he pleased his political masters, he alien-
ated his own troops. The extensive nature of the mutiny—it spread rapidly across
the British outposts in North America—revealed the soldiers’ deep commitment
to defending the pay to which they felt themselves entitled. Faced with such ex-
tensive resistance, Amherst had no choice but to stage a tactical retreat. A few
weeks after bringing in the change, he offered concessions that lessened the
monetary loss to the soldiers.32 But even in this moderated version, Amherst’s
“reform” of deductions left the rank and ﬁle worse off than they had been before.
The mutiny subsided, though not in some garrisons until the spring of 1764, and
resentment remained for years afterward, not least among some of the junior
ofﬁcers, who were all too aware of the hardship inﬂicted on their soldiers.33 Both
the government and the military leadership should have anticipated that any
attempt to alter the rank and ﬁle’s remuneration would cause trouble. A similar
mutiny had occurred at the end of the previous war, in 1747, when regular sol-
diers in the garrison of recently captured Louisbourg objected to the introduc-
tion of new deductions.34
30 National Archives of Scotland, Leven and Melville Muniments, GD 26/9/520/14.
31 Paul E. Kopperman, “The Stoppages Mutiny of 1763,” Western Pennsylvania
Historical Magazine 69 ð1986Þ: 241–54; Way, “Rebellion of the Regulars”; Brumwell,
Redcoats, 133–35.
32 BL, Bouquet Papers, Add. MS 21,635, fols. 6–8.
33 See Lieut. William Feilding to the Earl of Denbigh, January 19, 1776, in The Lost
War: Letters from British Officers during the American Revolution, ed. Marion Balder-
stone and David Syrett ðNew York, 1975Þ, 60.
34 See Robert Ellison to Henry Ellison, 28 June 1747, in Edward Hughes, ed., “The
Correspondence of Colonel Robert Ellison of Hebern, 1733–48,” Archaelogia Aeliana,
4th ser., 31 ð1953Þ: 17; National Archives of Scotland, Hamilton-Dalrymple of North Ber-
wick Muniments, GD 110/919/12, John Suttie to Sir Hew Dalrymple, June 30, 1747.
phenomenon, see John Prebble, Mutiny: Highland Regiments in Revolt, 1743–1804
ðHarmondsworth, 1975Þ.
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Much less conspicuous, but no less important, was the smaller-scale mutinous
behavior, sparked by disputes about pay, which seems to have been as common-
place in the British army as it was in the American Continental forces. A frequent
cause of rank-and-ﬁle grievance was failure to pay additional money for extra
work that they considered above and beyond their duty as military men. Amherst
in 1759 tried to end disputes on this issue by stipulating the rates of pay to which
soldiers were entitled if they served as artiﬁcers or laborers in the public service.35
In December 1763, his successor, Thomas Gage, advised the secretary at war that
soldiers whose pay was now reduced by deductions for their provisions were
even more likely to be sensitive about receiving proper remuneration “for every
piece of work” undertaken “for the Publick.”36 Late pay was even more conten-
tious, and much more difﬁcult for ofﬁcers to tackle. In 1777 more than ﬁfty
troops in different British regiments in North America refused to obey orders
until their grievances—notably pay arrears—were redressed.37 Nor was mu-
tiny the only response of the soldiers to delays in receiving pay. In October
1745, George Wade, commander of the British forces assembled in northern
England to resist the advance of the Jacobite army from Scotland, told the gov-
ernment in London that he desperately needed more money, “for if the Troops
are not regularly paid, they will of course plunder the Country.”38
British soldiers similarly showed their contractual mind-set when they pro-
tested at inadequate provisions. Troops at Oswego mutinied in the summer of
1755 when they regarded reduced rations as a violation of “their Right.”39 If their
regular food rations were cut, they also had little compunction in stealing food
from local inhabitants. At times, when on campaign, genuine food shortages could
mean that soldiers purloined food because they were desperately hungry. As
British troops on Burgoyne’s expedition advanced into New York and ran short
of food, they dug up potatoes scarcely ﬁt to eat “without thinking in the least of
the owner.”40 Burgoyne’s orders commented disapprovingly that “Parties of thirty
and Forty men att a time have gone out of Camp, and taken away Every kind of
Greens Which the Inhabitants had for the Sustenance of their Famillys.”41 But
even when there was no absolute shortage of food, ofﬁcers recognized that unless
their soldiers were supplied with fresh provisions to supplement the salt rations
sent from Britain and Ireland, trouble would ensue. Desertion might be justiﬁed
35 Brumwell, Redcoats, 128.
36 Clarence Edwin Carter, ed., The Correspondence of General Thomas Gage with the
Secretaries of State, and with the War Office and the Treasury, 1763–1775, 2 vols. ðNew
Haven, CT, 1931Þ, 2:215.
37 Frey, British Soldier in America, 73–4.
38 University Library, Nottingham, Newcastle of Clumber MSS, NeC 1691, Wade to
Henry Pelham, October 17, 1745.
39 Brumwell, Redcoats, 128.
40 BL, Diary of Lieut. William Digby, Add. MS 32,413, fol. 64.
41 William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan, Forty-seventh Foot Order-book
ðtypescript copyÞ, August 27, 1777.
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by a lack of fresh food. Ofﬁcers sometimes associated soldiers’ plundering from
the inhabitants with a shortage—or unfair distribution—of fresh meat.42
Court-martial records provide us with one of the few ways of glimpsing rank-
and-ﬁle attitudes at ﬁrst hand, rather than through the refracted accounts left
by their ofﬁcers. Testimony given at courts-martial suggests that soldiers saw any
reduction in their rations as a breach of the implied military contract. Thomas
Reedman, a private in the light infantry company of the Forty-third Foot, accused
with others in March 1779 of having killed and stolen an ox on Long Island, New
York, argued that he had been “forced to it” by the removal from his standard
rations of the “Small Species”—items such as butter, cheese, and peas. His fellow
defendants, tried the next day, put forward the same defense.43 On the face of it,
their argument seems odd and unconvincing. It was the small species that were
missing from their rations, not the meat. Why should they steal meat to make up
for a loss of the small species? But their action becomes more explicable if we
think in contractual terms: the soldiers believed that their ofﬁcers had failed to
provide them with the full rations that were their entitlement, which meant that
they were now free to ﬁnd their own food supplies. Some support for this inter-
pretation comes in the form of a letter written a few years earlier by an ofﬁcer to his
father, in which the ofﬁcer explains that “If the men chuse it, they may receive 7lb
of fresh beef, instead of all the articles ½in their standard ration except ﬂour.”44
Reedman and his colleagues perhaps reasoned that as the small species had been
removed from their rations, they were within their rights in seeking fresh meat as
a replacement.
II
American provincial soldiers who came into contact with the British regulars in
the Seven Years’War often commented on the extreme ﬂoggings and even capital
penalties inﬂicted on disobedient soldiers. Capital punishment may have been far
from unknown in colonial America, but the courts usually limited corporal pen-
alties to the biblically sanctioned thirty-nine strokes of the whip.45 To colonists
accustomed to such a system, British military practice appeared shockingly in-
42 For the consequences of a lack of fresh provisions, see R. A. Bowler, Logistics and
the Failure of the British Army in America, 1775–1783 ðPrinceton, NJ, 1975Þ, 53; and
Henry Cabot Lodge, ed., André’s Journal, 2 vols. ðBoston, 1903Þ, 1:71.
43 TNA, War Ofﬁce Papers, WO 71/88, pp. 324–34.
44 Frederick Mackenzie to his father, June 29, 1773, in A British Fusilier in Revolu-
tionary Boston: being the Diary of Lieutenant Frederick Mackenzie, Adjutant of the Royal
Welch Fusiliers, January 5–April 30, 1775, with a Letter describing His Voyage to America,
ed. Allen French ðCambridge, MA, 1926Þ, 19.
45 See Kathryn Preyer, “Penal Measures in the American Colonies: An Overview,”
American Journal of Legal History 26 ð1982Þ: 326–53. See also, for the study of a par-
ticular colony, Douglas Greenberg, Crime and Law Enforcement in the Colony of New
York, 1691–1776 ðIthaca, NY, 1974Þ.
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humane. One anonymous American diarist, apparently from a New England pro-
vincial regiment, noted in October 1755 the death of a British soldier who had
been whipped the day before; shortly afterward, he recorded the severe whip-
ping of two further regulars.46 Another New Englander, part of the garrison of
newly conquered Louisbourg in October 1758, equally appalled by the penal-
ties that could be inﬂicted under martial law, observed that “ye regulars . . . are
but little better than slaves to their Ofﬁcers.”47
British general courts-martial—the highest military tribunals—sentenced con-
victed men to 500 lashes as a matter of course; it was not unusual for them to
stipulate one thousand for more serious offences.48 Very occasionally, offenders
found themselves facing an even greater ordeal: ﬁve soldiers of the grenadier
company of the Seventy-ﬁrst Highland Regiment, convicted of robbing a New
York inhabitant in March 1779, were each sentenced to 1,500 lashes.49 The most
heinous crimes, or those that most detrimentally affected the army’s discipline,
attracted the death penalty.50 Even brigade, garrison, and regimental courts mar-
tial, dealing with lesser offences, could lay down punishments in excess of the up-
per limit of the number of lashes usually inﬂicted on soldiers in the Continental
army.51 In June 1744, William Harris, a soldier in the Royal Regiment of Fusil-
iers, was sentenced by a regimental court-martial in England to 200 lashes for
selling his “new Regimt Shirt & Shoes.”52 At Philadelphia, thirty-three years later,
an artilleryman found guilty of “being Absent seven Days without leave” was or-
dered by a brigade court-martial “to Receive 500 Lashes in the Usual Manner.”53
Order books, which contain copies of the commander-in-chief’s instructions to
the army as a whole, or of brigade or regimental commanders’ orders to par-
ticular units, repeatedly threatened the common soldiers with extreme penalties
if they transgressed even in the most minor way ð“The Soldiers are once more
forbidden to go into any Man’s Field or Garden, to steal roots; any one detected
46 Newberry Library, Chicago, Case MS oE 199, M 36 1755, Anon. Diary of the
French and Indian War, October 24 and 28, 1755.
47 B. F. Brown, ed., “Extracts fromGibson Clough’s Journal,”Historical Collections of
the Essex Institute 3 ð1861Þ: 104.
48 For punishment in the British service, see Frey, British Soldier in America, chap. 4.
For British general courts-martial sentences from the American war period, see TNA, War
Ofﬁce Papers, WO 71/80–95.
49 TNA, War Ofﬁce Papers, WO 71/88, p. 350.
50 See, e.g., Rules and Articles for the Better Government of His Majesty’s . . . Forces
ðLondon, 1778Þ, 39–43.
51 For regimental courts-martial, see Glen Steppler, “British Military Law, Discipline,
and the Conduct of Regimental Courts Martial in the Later Eighteenth Century,” English
Historical Review 102 ð1987Þ: 859–87.
52 Royal Fusiliers ðCity of London RegimentÞ Museum, the Tower of London, MS
R-26ðaÞ.
53 Royal Artillery Institution, Brigade Order-Book, 1777–78, MS 57, p. 103.
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will be severely punished.”Þ54 On some occasions, senior ofﬁcers promised sum-
mary execution for soldiers who stole from the local inhabitants.55
Rather than accepting this brutally violent picture as all we need to know about
how authority was exercised in the British army, we might want to consider a dif-
ferent perspective; one that gives rather more agency to the soldiers themselves.
Repeated orders promising dire penalties—up to and including death—might be
interpreted as a sign not of the power of ofﬁcers, but of their weakness. Orders
would not have had to be repeated if they were being obeyed; threats would not
have had to be made time after time if soldiers were truly deterred by the pos-
sibility of the most awful retribution. General Howe, having told his troops shortly
after they landed on Long Island in August 1776 that “he is determined to Shew
no mercy to any man found Guilty of Maurauding,” found himself obliged to
make the same claim a few days later: “The General again repeats in Orders,
that no Mercy will be shewn to any Man found Guilty, of Plundering.” The fol-
lowing week, the response had apparently been so unsatisfactory that he felt he
had to up the level of threat: “The Provost Martial ½sic has a Commission to Ex-
ecute upon the Spot any Soldier he ﬁnds Guilty of Marauding.” For all Howe’s
attempts to sound tough, the impression that his men were not deterred is hard
to avoid. We can even detect a trace of desperation in his orders.56
Once we appreciate the limits of ofﬁcers’ power, we can begin to discern the
importance of negotiated authority. Ofﬁcers could not take their men for granted
and assume a robotic obedience; they were obliged to recognize that the rank and
ﬁle had minds of their own, with which they had to engage in order to encourage
them to do their duty. Major John Pitcairn, in charge of the Marines in the Bos-
ton garrison just before the outbreak of the War of Independence, wrote of treat-
ing his men “with mildness” and seeking “to persuade them to behave well.”57
Either through choice or necessity, ofﬁcers like Pitcairn dealt with their soldiers
as thinking beings, capable of responding to exercises of clemency, paternal care,
and appeals—personal, professional, and political. Many of the methods British
ofﬁcers employed, in other words, bore a remarkable resemblance to those usually
associated with the American Continental army during the War of Independence.
54 TNA, War Ofﬁce Papers, WO 36/2, fol. 34.
55 See, e.g., the order-book entry of December 5, 1775, in The Kemble Papers, vol. 1,
New-York Historical Society Collections, 16 ðNew York, 1884Þ, 269; and Library of Con-
gress, Washington, DC, Washington Papers, Series 6B, vol. I, Captured British Order-
book, June 21, 1777.
56 William L. Clements Library, General Order-book of the forces under Howe, Au-
gust 23 and 31, September 6, 1776. It should be said that some of his subordinates crit-
icized Howe for not carrying out his threatened punishments: see, e.g., E. Stuart Wortley,
ed., A Prime Minister and His Son from the Correspondence of the Third Earl of Bute and
Lt. General the Hon. Charles Stuart, K.B. ðLondon, 1925Þ, 99, 116.
57 BL, Mackenzie Papers, Add. MS 39,190, fol. 209.
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Even though the British army’s courts-martial sentenced soldiers to terrifying
punishments, these were not always inﬂicted. Capital penalties were often remit-
ted, and general ofﬁcers,who had to conﬁrmgeneral court-martial decisions, some-
times chose to lessen the severity of corporal punishments.58 Regimental com-
manders, for their part, exercised discretion over which men to send up to a
general court-martial and which to bring before their own lesser court-martial,
where they could control the level of the penalty.59 They could also use their
power of clemency to pardon offenders brought before lower courts: Colonel Pat-
tison of the Royal Artillery did so on numerous occasions while his unit was
stationed in Philadelphia during the War of Independence.60 Even junior ofﬁcers
might decide which offenses to report to their superiors and which to overlook:
Captain John Peebles of the Forty-second Foot allowed his men some latitude
when it came to stealing root vegetables and garden produce;61 Captain Patrick
Ferguson of the Seventieth drew the line at poultry and pigs.62 Company ofﬁcers
might also provide character references for offenders brought before courts-
martial or pleadmitigating circumstances to reduce their punishment. At a general
court-martial held in Boston in December 1775, Captain William Foster of the
Marines testiﬁed that a soldier in his company accused of stealing wine “was one
of the last men he should have suspected to have been guilty of theft.”63
Discretion, some scholars argue in relation to the workings of the eighteenth-
century English penal system, was merely a tool used to reinforce authority, a
“soft” accompaniment to the “hard” approach of the extensive use of the capital
penalty.64 If we apply this view to the army and its punishment regime, we might
58 See, e.g., William L. Clements Library, Sir Henry Clinton Papers, Order of Au-
gust 15, 1780.
59 For an insight into the scope provided by lesser courts-martial, see TNA, War Ofﬁce
Papers, WO 72/8, Stephen Payne Adye ðdeputy judge advocate in AmericaÞ to Charles
Gould ðthe judge-advocate generalÞ, May 20, 1778.
60 Royal Artillery Institution, Royal Artillery Brigade Orders, 1777–78, MS 57,
pp. 102, 140, 159–60, 184, 185, 190, 199.
61 Ira D. Gruber, ed., John Pebbles’ American War: The Diary of a Scottish Grenadier,
1776–1782 ðMechanicsburg, PA, 1998Þ, 481.
62 William L. Clements Library, Clinton Papers, Ferguson’s report, November, 1779.
63 TNA, War Ofﬁce Papers, WO 71/82, p. 231.
64 Douglas Hay, “Property, Authority, and the Criminal Law,” in Douglas Hay, Peter
Linebaugh, John J. Rule, E. P. Thompson, and Cal Winslow, Albion’s Fatal Tree: Crime
and Society in Eighteenth-Century England ðHarmondsworth, 1977Þ, 17–63. Hay’s argu-
ment, it should be said, set off a lively debate: see, e.g., John Langbein, “Albion’s Fatal
Flaws,” Past & Present, no. 98 ð1983Þ: 96–120; Peter King, “Decision-Makers and
Decision-Making in the English Criminal Law, 1750–1800,” Historical Journal 27
ð1984Þ: 27–54; Peter Linebaugh, “ðMarxistÞ Social History and ðConservativeÞ Legal
History: A Reply to Professor Langbein,” New York University Law Review 60 ð1985Þ:
212–43. Peter King returns to the issue in his Crime, Justice, and Discretion in England,
1740–1820 ðOxford, 2000Þ.
48 Conway
This content downloaded from 128.041.035.120 on April 03, 2017 07:37:48 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
see discretionary activity—whatever form it took—as doing little more than mar-
ginally tempering the violence of an essentially coercive system of control, and
at the same time strengthening its terrorizing impact by enhancing the impression
that the ofﬁcer had the ﬁnal say over the soldier’s fate. But, on the basis of the
evidence available, we could just as easily argue that ofﬁcers’ use of discretion
reﬂected their realization that terror alone could not induce their men to follow
orders. Ofﬁcers felt the need to cultivate their soldiers’ loyalty and affection; dis-
cretion might even be conceived as a form of persuasion.
We can see paternalism in the same way. It no doubt reinforced ofﬁcers’ au-
thority by making soldiers grateful, but it also suggests that ofﬁcers recognized
that their men had to be won over; their obedience could not be taken for granted.
To encourage the troops, and to show them that the army’s leaders cared, general
ofﬁcers ordered rewards to be given to the common soldiers at particular mo-
ments. Earl Cornwallis seems to have been especially committed to this approach.
In the spring and summer of 1781, he decided that his troops in North Carolina
and Virginia should be given extra allowances of rum on numerous occasions.65
Different sources reveal that regimental ofﬁcers offered ﬁnancial assistance
when their men were in distress. A surviving notebook of Lieutenant-Colonel
Sir John Wrottesley of the Guards suggests that he lent impecunious soldiers
money during the Pennsylvania campaign of 1777.66 Ensign Daniel Gwynne of
the Ninth Foot wrote home to arrange for his sergeant’s pay to be transmitted to a
needy relative ð“The poorMan had noway of sending it to her but by applying to
me,”Gwynne told his father on June 11, 1778Þ.67 The journal of Captain Charles
Napier of the Eightieth Foot shows that he decided to make ﬁnancial provision
for the widow and two children of one of his company sergeants who had died
on the voyage from Scotland to New York in August 1779.68 In each of these
cases, we can view the ofﬁcers’ actions teleologically, as having the likely result
of increasing their hold over the rank and ﬁle, but we should also recognize that
for the ofﬁcers themselves the spur might well have been a sense that they had
to demonstrate a commitment to their men if they were to expect their men to
show a commitment to them.
British ofﬁcers reasoned with their soldiers on many occasions. Orders ap-
pealed to the soldier’s self-interest as often as they threatened dire retribution for
disobedience. InMarch 1777, Howe informed the troops under his command that
“Several Lots of Ground being now inclos’d in Order to supply the Army . . . with
65 William L. Clements Library, Order-book, Cornwallis’s forces, April 23, May 14,
19, 20, 23, 30, 1781; Library of Congress, British Order-book, Virginia, June 4, 1781;
Boston Public Library, Boston, Massachusetts, MS qAm 1995, Order-book of Capt. John
Hawthorn, Eightieth Foot, July 4, 1781.
66 Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Sir John Wrottesley’s Notebook.
67 Clwyd Archives, Haverfordwest, Gwynne Letters, D/CT/271.
68 BL, Napier Family Papers, Add. MS 49,092, fol. 38.
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Greens and Vegetables of all Kinds,” he would therefore punish any soldiers
“guilty of breaking down any Fence or Inclosure.”69 Soldiers often took down
fences and other wooden structures to use for fuel; Howe was explaining that
the removal of fences could have adverse effects on the soldiers’ food supplies.
Brigade orders for the British troops campaigning in Virginia in 1781 similarly
treated soldiers as rational beings, capable of responding to appeals to their self-
interest as well as to fear. On June 1, the commander of the brigade ordered his
men not to “destroy the Bolting Cloths or any thing belonging to the Milns in the
Country, as it is of great importance to the Army having them ﬁt for use.” The
next day’s orders revealed that the appeal had not worked, but at the same time
that ofﬁcers continued to rely on the soldier’s sense of his own interests to secure
compliance. “The reason the Troops can only be supplied with Indian meal in-
stead of Flour is owing to some Soldiers having cut the Boulting Cloth at Prices
Mill.” This explanation was followed by a threat of punishment for anyone “de-
tected in cutting or spoiling any thing belonging to a Mill”—but the incentive for
good behavior was increased by promising that the offender’s unit would “receive
Indian Meal or Flour with the Bean in it for the next Fortnight.”70
In this last example we see an appeal to self-interest supplemented by an appeal
to unit solidarity—disobedience would disadvantage not just the individual
involved but all of his comrades, too. Ofﬁcers often proceeded on the assumption
that regimental pride could be used to secure good behavior. An ofﬁcer of the
Forty-seventh Foot, when it was camped at Fort Edward, New York, during Bur-
goyne’s descent from Quebec, told his troops that two “hardened and atro-
cious wretches,” who had robbed and threatened an inhabitant, were now in
custody—“a Circumstance which he doubts not, will give the highest satisfac-
tion to all the men; who he is sensible, felt equally with himself, the insult that
had been offered them, and the Ignominy which was stamped upon the
Corps.”71 As the army marched across New Jersey, in the summer of 1778, the
commander of another unit attempted a similar appeal to group pride: as “No
Regiment having been formerly more Conspicuous for its Discipline than the
Royal Fusiliers,” the lieutenant-colonel described himself as “Mortiﬁed at
Observing the great Irregularity and Excesses that have been Committed within
these few days.”72
Ofﬁcers also played on their men’s sense of soldierly honor without referring
to their regiment or corps. When Howe’s troops were about to land on Staten Island
in the summer of 1776, the general appealed to his soldiers’ “Superior Discipline” as
69 New York State Library, Albany, MS 6744, Order-book, Howe’s army, March 16,
1777.
70 Library of Congress, British Order-book, Virginia, June 1 and 2, 1781.
71 William L. Clements Library, Forty-seventh Foot Order-book ðtypescript copyÞ,
August 7, 1777.
72 Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Seventh Foot Order-book, June 21, 1778.
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he tried to persuade them not to ill-treat the local inhabitants.73 The next year, troops
of the Forty-seventh Foot were upbraided following a drunken brawl with German
auxiliaries. Their ofﬁcer conveyed the impression that the most shocking aspect of
their indiscipline was that “one of the greatest principals of military Order was so far
forgot by someBritish Soldiers that a Guardwas insulted.”74 Cornwallis, for his part,
spared no rhetorical effort to persuade his troops in North Carolina that without their
help in detecting plunderers, “the Blood of the Brave & Deserving Soldiers will be
Shed in vain, & it will not be even in the power of Victory to give Success.”75
During the War of Independence, ofﬁcers often appealed to their troops by
referring to the need to win over the people, or to protect loyal inhabitants who
had already suffered at the hands of the rebels. The soldiers, in other words, were
treated as though they understood that this was a struggle for American alle-
giances and not just a conventional conﬂict between two armies. Before the main
British army sailed from Halifax to New York to begin the 1776 campaign, Howe
reminded his men that they were wrong if they imagined that “the Crime of
stealing is lessened” if the property they took belonged to “persons ill affected to
Government.” Rather than just requiring obedience, he explained why the troops
should follow his order: pillaging not only eroded the army’s discipline but also
risked losing “the affection of the people.”76 When, later the same month, his
soldiers arrived in New York harbor and were preparing to land, Howe also
stressed the politics of the war, though this time he justiﬁed restraint on the
grounds that the people were friendly. “As the Inhabitants of the Country are
known to be well affected to Government & have suffer’d great depredations
from the rebels,” Howe “recommends” that the troops offer “protection ½to the
Familys & properties of the people of the Country.”77 Lieutenant-Colonel Archi-
bald Campbell issued similar orders to the soldiers under his command as they
prepared to land in Georgia in late December 1778. He reminded the troops that
the purpose of their expedition was “the Relief and Protection of His Majesty’s
Loyal Inhabitants . . . who have long withstood the Savage Oppression of
Congress.”78
Campbell, as we can see, assumed that his men were familiar with the political
dimension of the war and aware of the peculiar nature of the conﬂict. He was not
73 William L. Clements Library, Order-book of the forces under Howe, June 29, 1776.
74 William L. Clements Library, Forty-seventh Foot Order-book ðtypescript copyÞ,
July 18, 1777.
75 A. R. Newsome, ed., “A British Orderly Book, 1780–1781,” North Carolina
Historical Review 9 ð1932Þ: 296.
76 National Army Museum, 5904/175, Fourteenth Foot Order-book, June 7, 1776.
77 William L. Clements Library, Order-book of the forces under Howe, June 29, 1776.
78 Isle of Cana, Campbell of Inverneil Papers, “General Orders on Board the Phoenix
Man of War. 22d. December 1778,” Campbell’s Journal of an Expedition against the
Rebels of Georgia, p. 20.
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alone. British ofﬁcers—just like their American Continental army counterparts—
made direct appeals to the cause for which their troops were ﬁghting. Perhaps we
might interpret such appeals as attempts to inspire soldiers to extra effort rather
than to persuade them to obey. But in practice the two are difﬁcult—perhaps
impossible—to disentangle. While we have little or no direct testimony to help us
to understand ofﬁcers’ thinking, it seems reasonable to suppose that they believed
that inspiration encouraged soldiers to follow orders that the uninspired might
question, or even refuse to accept. Inspiration, in other words, could be a form of
persuasion, which ofﬁcers used because they recognized that they could not be
sure of the soldiers’ obedience.
The soldier’s patriotism was often invoked. Cornwallis ﬂattered his troops by
referring to his having “seen so many proofs of their Zeal for the Service of their
Country.”79 A short while later, to deter soldiers from “Stragling out of Camp in
search ofWhiskey,” he appealed to them as individuals, claiming that each soldier
possessed “so much Honor & publick Spirit” that “at a time when Britain has so
many Enemies And his Country has somuchOccasion for his Services,” hewould
“not run the hazard” of being captured by the enemy.80 British ofﬁcers also re-
ferred in more philosophical terms to the cause for which the army was ﬁghting.
Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, as part of his attempt to persuade his troops not to
misbehave when they landed in Georgia, referred to his own pride at leading “such
gallant Troops, . . . employed on a service so essential to his Country, by which
the Rights of Britons may be secured, legal Government established, and the In-
solence of usurped Authority annihilated.”81
III
British ofﬁcers and rank-and-ﬁle soldiers turn out, then, to have had much more
in common with their American counterparts than many contemporary and his-
torical accounts allow. But it was not just Americans who exaggerated—and in
many cases, still exaggerate—the distinctiveness of their military. Britons were
ðand areÞ no less inclined to identify their army as different from others. The point
of comparison in their case was continental Europe, and particularly the German
states, where soldiers were thought to be poor benighted creatures, reduced to
a robotic obedience by themost brutal discipline—an image remarkably similar to
the one beloved by Americans describing the British army.82
79 Newsome, “A British Orderly Book,” 296.
80 William L. Clements Library, Order-book of Cornwallis’s forces, February 22, 1781.
81 Isle of Cana, Campbell of Inverneil Papers, “General Orders on Board the Phoenix
Man of War. 22d. December 1778,” Campbell’s Journal, p. 20.
82 For a modern and more wide-ranging comparison, see John Childs, “The Army and
the State in Britain andGermany during the Eighteenth Century,” in Rethinking Leviathan:
The Eighteenth-Century State in Britain and Germany, ed. John Brewer and Eckhart
Hellmuth ðOxford, 1999Þ, 53–70.
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In June 1743, Lord De La Warr, an ofﬁcer in the British army then campaign-
ing in western Germany, related an encounter with Prussian troops who were
garrisoning the Rhineland outpost of Wesel. “In this Town,” he wrote porten-
tously to Lord Cowper, “we ﬁrst Saw Prussian discipline.” The soldiers, he went
on to explain, were treated like “so many Slaves and Prisoners.”83 His implica-
tion, of course, was that his own men were not. Britons observing the harsh
punishment regime of the German auxiliaries who fought alongside their own
army in the War of Independence also gave the impression that these methods
were quite different from the ones pursued in the British military. An English
traveler, after having witnessed Hessian discipline for the ﬁrst time, in the bloody
form of running the gauntlet inﬂicted on an unfortunate corporal, denounced the
auxiliaries as “a set of cruel unfeeling people.”84
Some German sources themselves seem to corroborate the picture painted by
British commentators. The journal of a Hessian sergeant records matter-of-factly
that one soldier was sentenced by a court-martial “to run the gauntlet 18 times on
2 days through 200 men.”85 Another Hessian soldier related how conscripts who
had planned to desert were betrayed and then punished by having “to run the
gauntlet, from twelve to thirty-six times.” The observer, recently conscripted
himself, was clearly horriﬁed by such brutality: “It was simple butchery,” he
wrote.86 Frederick the Great of Prussia, the preeminent German commander of the
age, recommended iron discipline to keep his troops in order. Any infraction had
to be punished severely, Frederick pronounced, since the common soldiers “can
be held in check only by fear.”87 German accounts, furthermore, suggest that the
British troops were more resistant to this kind of treatment. Baroness von
Riedesel, the wife of the senior Brunswick ofﬁcer in North America during the
War of Independence, noted in her journal that the British soldiers with whom
the baron served were “proud and, as the common belief has it, difﬁcult to keep in
submission.”88
On the basis of such statements, we might be tempted to conclude that the
military moral economy, contractual thinking, and negotiated authority were part
of a distinctly Anglo-American political culture. Britons and Americans, after all,
shared the same language of liberty, however much they might disagree in the
83 Hertfordshire Archives and Local Studies, Hertford, Cowper Papers, D/EP F249, De
La Warr to William Cowper, 2nd Earl Cowper, June 16, 1743.
84 The Journal of Nicholas Cresswell, 1774–1777 ðLondon, 1925Þ, 221.
85 Thomas H. Edsall, ed. and trans., The Journal of Lieutenant John Charles Philip
von Krafft ðNew York, 1968Þ, 159.
86 Margarete Woelfel, ed. and trans., “Memoirs of a Hessian Conscript: J. G. Seume’s
Reluctant Voyage to America,” William & Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 5 ð1948Þ: 558.
87 Jay Luvaas, ed. and trans., Frederick the Great on the Art of War ðNewYork, 1966Þ,
77.
88 Marvin L. Brown Jr., ed. and trans., Baroness von Riedesel and the American
Revolution: Journal and Correspondence of a Tour of Duty, 1776–1783 ðChapel Hill,
NC, 1965Þ, 109.
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revolutionary period about its meaning and implications. Both thought in terms
of the rights of the “freeborn Englishman,” a body of entitlements derived from
natural law but partially enshrined in such constitutional landmarks as Magna
Charta ð1215Þ, the Petition of Right ð1628Þ, and the Bill of Rights ð1689Þ.89 We
might easily see the character of the British and American armies, then, as a prod-
uct of the participatory and antiauthoritarian political dispensation that united, as
well as ultimately divided, the transatlantic British nation.90 If negotiated au-
thority and contractual tendencies were more marked in the American military
than in the British, we could regard this merely as a reﬂection of the more hierar-
chical and deferential nature of eighteenth-century Britain; but those tendencies
were still discernible in the British army, which, like the American, was inevitably
shaped by the rights-based society from which it emerged.
Yet replacing the notion of American military exceptionalism with a broader
vision of Anglo-American distinctiveness will not do. German forces differed
from the American and British in many respects, particularly in the way in which
they were recruited, with a much heavier emphasis in German armies on con-
scription to ﬁll the ranks, and a more aristocratically dominated ofﬁcer class.91 In
the view of some historians, furthermore, German soldiers came from a very dif-
ferent kind of society from their British and the American counterparts, one that
was much more ordered and regimented.92 Even so, many of the attitudes and
dynamics we can see in the American armed forces in bold and striking oil paints,
and in the British army in more muted pastel tones, still appear in the German
forces, albeit in the fainter hues of a watercolor.
Rank-and-ﬁle German auxiliary soldiers during the War of Independence seem
to have conceived of a military moral economy as much as their British and
89 For the seventeenth-century origins of the concept of “freeborn Englishmen,” see
Rachel Foxley, “John Lilburne and the Citizenship of ‘Free-born Englishmen,’”Historical
Journal 47 ð2004Þ: 849–74.
90 For the rights of Britons, or, more often, of Englishmen, that featured so heavily in
colonial protests against parliamentary taxation in the 1760s, see, e.g., Edmund S. Morgan,
ed., Prologue to Revolution: Sources and Documents on the Stamp Act Crisis, 1764–1766
ðChapel Hill, NC, 1959Þ.
91 For conscription, see, e.g., Christopher Duffy, The Military Experience in the Age
of Reason ðLondon, 1987Þ, 89–94; M. S. Anderson, The War of the Austrian Succession,
1740–1748 ðLondon, 1995Þ, 29–35. See also Peter H. Wilson, “The Politics of Military
Recruitment in Eighteenth-Century Germany,” English Historical Review 117 ð2002Þ:
536–68. For comparisons of the proportion of noble ofﬁcers ðwhich can be a little mis-
leading, given that titles were bestowed more readily on the Continent than in the British
IslesÞ, see Christopher Storrs and H. M. Scott, “The Military Revolution and the Euro-
pean Nobility, c. 1600–1800,” War in History 3 ð1996Þ: 15–16.
92 Peter K. Taylor, Indentured to Liberty: Peasant Life and the Hessian Military State,
1688–1815 ðIthaca, NY, 1994Þ, esp. chap. 6. More generally, see Marc Raeff, Well-
Ordered Police State: Social and Institutional Change through Law in the Germanies and
Russia, 1600–1800 ðNew Haven, CT, 1983Þ.
54 Conway
This content downloaded from 128.041.035.120 on April 03, 2017 07:37:48 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
American counterparts did, and, like British and American ﬁghting men, they
saw their service in contractual terms. Ansbach-Bayreuth troops displayed a
keen sense of their entitlements when they mutinied over what they perceived
as unfair treatment by their ofﬁcers while the unit was in captivity in Maryland
after the surrender at Yorktown. While the background to the Ansbachers’ re-
sistance is unclear, the diary of one of the troops suggests that a dispute over
pay was a factor. On this occasion, as all those involved were prisoners of war,
we might reasonably conclude that the ofﬁcers were in a less powerful position
than normal, as their command over their men had already been undermined.
Yet the same diarist recorded an Ansbach-Bayreuth soldier’s speaking out about
a grievance regarding his pay some years before.93 A different source reveals that
the Ansbach grenadiers collectively complained in 1777 when they were not paid
what they felt was their fair share of “the ½prize Money distributed amongst the
Troops that were employed in the Jerseys.”94
We also know that Ansbach troops displayed a propensity to desert if re-
quired to work on fortifying positions; the soldiers in question appear to have re-
garded such labor as a breach of the military contract.95 A German noncommis-
sioned ofﬁcer noticed a similar reluctance—among the Hessians rather than the
Ansbachers—to stay with the colors if regular rations were not forthcoming. The
Hessian Jägers, according to his account, “deserted in large numbers” when they
had to endure short rations ð“scarcely 5 lbs of bread in 7 days and 2 days rice in-
stead of bread”Þ in November 1778. The same noncommissioned ofﬁcer com-
mented the following month that the problem would become much more wide-
spread if supplies remained below the standard that the soldiers expected: “if
bread should fail for a few days more, a general desertion would be inevitable.”96
British commentators in the same war, despite the tendency of some of them
to trumpet the difference between their own men and the Hessians, also acknowl-
edged that German soldiers thought and acted in accord with their understanding
of military service as contractual. In the autumn of 1775, the British government
negotiated with Lieutenant-Colonel Georg von Scheither, a Hanoverian ofﬁcer, who
offered to raise a contingent of troops in Germany for British service. Scheither
initially hoped to recruit a military unit that he himself would command ðas he
had done in the Seven Years’ WarÞ and began to enlist soldiers on that basis. He
soon discovered, however, that Lord North’s government wanted to incorporate
his soldiers into existing ðand understrengthÞ British regiments. An ofﬁcial either
93 Johan Conrad Döhla, A Hessian Diary of the American Revolution, ed. and trans.
Bruce E. Burgoyne ðNorman, OK, 1990Þ, 112, 202.
94 William L. Clements Library, Clinton Papers, Charles Cathcart to Clinton, Novem-
ber 5, 1777.
95 Joseph G. Rosengarten, ed. and trans., “Popp’s Journal, 1777–1783,” Pennsylvania
Magazine of History and Biography 26 ð1902Þ: 31–2.
96 Edsall, Journal of Lieutenant John Charles Philip von Krafft, 70, 76.
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at the War Ofﬁce or the Treasury, commenting on Scheither’s scheme, sensibly
warned that changing the conditions on which the men were recruited ran the risk
of encouraging desertion.While he offered no explanation, we can surmise that he
reckoned that Scheither’s troops would feel that they had been enlisted to serve
alongside fellow German recruits, but that they were now to be dispersed and
placed in British regiments where they would be isolated from their comrades.
The same author went on to argue that all Scheither’s recruits must be clearly in-
formed about deductions from their pay when they enlisted; otherwise they were
bound to feel aggrieved and were likely to desert.97 Captain John Bowater of the
BritishMarines, a far from sympathetic observer of Hessian ways, also recognized
that German soldiers, as much as the British rank and ﬁle, had a keen sense of en-
titlement based on a contractual attitude to their military service. Bowater claimed
in the late spring of 1777 that the Hessian auxiliary troops were cheated of half
their pay by their prince, who pocketed the money for himself. Unsurprisingly,
the German soldiers were “exceedingly dissatisfy’d at this, so that to make it up
they turn their whole thoughts upon plunder.”98
Other testimony suggests different reasons for Hessian pillaging in the ﬁrst
months of their campaigning in America, but it again highlights the German sol-
diers’ willingness to express their dissatisfaction when their settled expectations
were not met. In the view of Richard Lorentz, the Hessian paymaster general, and
Sir George Osborn, the British lieutenant-colonel who acted as Hessian muster-
master, the auxiliaries initially believed that they had been paid differently from
their British counterparts and protested at unaccustomed deductions from their
pay for food. As Lorentz put it in his faltering English: “The Troops not customed
to the loss of A Farthing on her Subsistance Money by Changing them maked
great difﬁculty.”99 Osborn, in a more polished manner, said much the same in his
examination before the House of Commons in May 1779: “At ﬁrst they com-
plained that any deduction should be made from their pay for provisions.” Only
when they discovered that they were regularly supplied, Osborn went on, did the
Hessian soldiers accept the stoppages.100
In the German units, as in the British and American ones, ofﬁcers recognized
the need to respect rank-and-ﬁle sensitivities. Captain Georg Pausch of the
97 TNA, Treasury Papers, T 1/514, fols. 130–1, “Remarks on Lieutenant Colonel
S½cheither’s Plan for raising Men in Germany for the service of Great Britain.” For more
on Scheither and his recruits, see the documents assembled in ibid., War Ofﬁce Papers,
WO 43/405. I am grateful to Dr. Mark Wishon for showing me his copies of further
material in Scheither’s family papers in Hanover’s Hauptstaatsarchiv, Hannover 47 II Nr
114.
98 Bowater to Denbigh, May 22, 1777, in Balderstone and Syrett, Lost War, 126.
99 TNA, British Army Headquarters ðCarleton or DorchesterÞ Papers, PRO 30/55/3,
255ð1Þ, Richard Lorentz to Frederick Mackenzie, August 24, 1776.
100 The Parliamentary Register; Or History of the Proceedings and Debates of the
House of Commons, xiii ðLondon, 1779Þ, 98.
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Hessen-Hannau artillery clearly disapproved of the way in which Lieutenant-
Colonel Schiether’s unfortunate troops were treated, describing them in his jour-
nal as “quite poorly maintained” and going on to note that “their complaints are
astonishing.” The context suggests that Pausch blamed the ofﬁcers for this situa-
tion, not the common soldiers for protesting.101 Major Carl von Baurmeister, the
adjutant-general of the Hessian forces, was no less critical of the way in which
Scheither’s recruits had been deceived and let down, writing that they had been
enlisted on a false basis and were therefore “low-spirited.” Baurmeister’s letters
and journals provide further evidence that German ofﬁcers showed a keen aware-
ness of their soldiers’ sense of what was right and proper. In September 1776,
Baurmeister reported back to the military authorities in Hessen-Kassel that when
Howe ordered German auxiliaries to help demolish the recently captured Brook-
lyn lines on Long Island, General Leopold von Heister, the Hessian commander-
in-chief, “pointed out that the troops could not be expected to do this work, which
would take four weeks, without remuneration.”Heister appreciated that his men’s
obedience could not be taken for granted: just as payment for extra work was a
sensitive issue for British soldiers, so it was for the Hessian rank and ﬁle. Another
episode recorded by Baurmeister relates to food shortages in the New York gar-
rison in January 1779. Baurmeister commented that “the common soldiers, ac-
customed to getting their provisions regularly and unable to procure anything ex-
tra, were virtually at the end of their patience.”As a result, he continued, desertions
had increased, despite the “greatest watchfulness” by the Hessian ofﬁcers.102
German commanders, like their British counterparts, knew that they had to
treat their men as thinking beings whose loyalty could not be guaranteed if the
army disappointed their expectations. Colonel Johann August von Loos demon-
strated a keen awareness of the need to show that he understood the soldiers’
concerns while on the voyage to North America. On the very day when he
recorded that the most attractive parts of the food supplies on board—mutton
and dried asparagus—had run out, Loos used the tactic of publicly articulating his
soldiers’ discontent about their pay to show them that he was on their side. As the
vessel in which he was sailing came alongside Admiral Lord Howe’s ﬂagship,
Loos, recognizing that the Hessian paymaster was on board, used a megaphone
to threaten Lorentz with dire consequences if the troops did not receive the money
due to them. According to Loos, the soldiers, on hearing the colonel berating the
unfortunate paymaster, shouted their support for their commanders’ words.103
101 Bruce E. Burgoyne, ed. and trans., Georg Pausch’s Journal and Reports of the
Campaign in America ðBowie, MD, 1996Þ, 16.
102 Bernhard A. Uhlendorf, ed., Revolution in America: Confidential Letters and
Journals 1776–1784 of Adjutant General Major Baurmeister of the Hessian Forces ðNew
Brunswick, NJ, 1957Þ, 59, 46, 248.
103 Valentine C. Hubbs, ed. and trans., Hessian Journals: Unpublished Documents of
the American Revolution ðColumbia, SC, 1981Þ, 28.
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Loos, in other words, appears to have successfully deﬂected any criticism—about
food or pay—from himself and his fellow ofﬁcers and successfully focused it on
Lorentz, an outsider to both Loos’s regiment and the Hessian army.
We also know that once they arrived in America, Hessian ofﬁcers allowed their
men some degree of latitude when it came to stealing food from the local in-
habitants. According to one account, written while its German author was a non-
commissioned ofﬁcer, when the soldiers in America were on short rations, of-
ﬁcers tended to overlook the theft of cattle, poultry, and pigs. Complaints from
aggrieved farmers elicited a decidedly lukewarm response from ofﬁcers who
appreciated that their men felt entitled to secure their own supplies when the army
failed to provide them: the thefts, in the nicely chosen words of this Hessian jour-
nal, were “not very closely investigated by the staff and other ofﬁcers.”104 The
testimony of German ofﬁcers themselves supports the claim. Captain Johann
Ewald of the Hessian Jägers, normally a stickler for discipline, turned a blind eye
to his soldiers’ taking “chickens, geese, and pigs” while they were encamped near
New Rochelle, NewYork, in October 1776.105 Latitude, as we have seen, could be
a tool to reinforce the ofﬁcer’s authority; he chose what to condone and what to
punish, thus creating a sense of his power, and gratitude at its not being used,
among those he commanded. But latitude might also reﬂect the ofﬁcer’s recog-
nition that too absolute an approach would be counterproductive; unless he
showed some willingness to compromise, to recognize the soldiers’ viewpoint,
his men would think him unreasonable and would be less inclined to obey orders
against more serious forms of plundering.
IV
Eighteenth-century Americans assumed that their own military was quite dif-
ferent from the British army that they fought alongside in the Seven Years’ War
and fought against in the War of Independence. Many American historians have
worked on the same assumption. Eighteenth-century Britons, for their part, also
liked to trumpet the uniqueness of their own army and contrast it with those of
other European powers, especially the German states; indeed, they readily asso-
ciated the British army with many of the libertarian tendencies that Americans
have seen as the hallmark of their own ﬁghting forces. British military historians,
rather than exploring the situation in other militaries, have tended to accept
eighteenth-century claims that the British army was very different from German
armies.
104 Edsall, Journal of Lieutenant John Charles Philip von Krafft, 60.
105 Joseph P. Tustin, ed. and trans., Diary of the American War: A Hessian Journal:
Captain Johann Ewald Field Jäger Corps ðNew Haven, CT, 1979Þ, 8.
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The contrast, both between Americans and Britons and between Britons and
Germans, was overdrawn in the eighteenth century, and to a striking extent it
continues to be overdrawn now. To say this is not to attempt to deny that differ-
ences existed between armies, even in the ways in which the military moral econ-
omy and contract were conceived and in which negotiated authority operated.
But those differences were usually ones of degree, not of principle. Rather than
thinking of contrasts and distinctiveness—of American or British military excep-
tionalism—we should recognize that common soldiers, European as well as Amer-
ican, conceived of a customary framework of rights and obligations and saw their
service in contractual terms, while their ofﬁcers recognized that their own power
was far from absolute.
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